

















Corporate taxes and the location of FDI in 










        
Corporate taxes and the location of FDI in Europe using firm-level data 
Corporate taxes and the location of FDI in Europe using firm-level data* 
 
Abstract: 
European countries are facing an ever-increasing competition for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This 
paper studies how corporate taxes affect the location of FDI in Europe. Firm-level data is used to 
estimate a conditional logit model. We start by analysing the impact of the level and volatility of three 
different tax rates on FDI. Next, we investigate how economic and monetary integration influences the 
effect of taxes on FDI. The interaction between taxes and the upward and downward cycles of FDI is 
also studied. Finally, we focus on how the impact of taxes depends on project characteristics. We 
conclude that taxes play a significant role in attracting FDI, but the issues analysed imply that there are 
some nuances in this relation, many of which can be relevant for policy makers. 
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1.  Introduction  
Since the second half of the 20th century and especially after 1980, Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) became increasingly important in the world and particularly in Europe.  The FDI inflows to 
European  countries  had  an  overall  positive  trend  between  1990  and  2009,  but  with  large 
oscillations (see Figure 1). The rapid growth of the late 1990’s led to a peak in 2000, when the 
value of FDI inflows to Europe was 5 times the value of 1997. The subsequent trough only 
occurred  in  2004;  after  that  it  peaks  in  2007,  being  the  value  of  FDI  inflows  in  2007 
approximately 5 times the value of 2004. In the last two years of the period in question Europe 
also reveals a severe decrease in FDI.  
Notice that  Europe  is one of the largest  destinations of FDI worldwide  having received 
approximately  43%  of  the  total  world  inflows  of  FDI  between  1990  and  2009.  Despite  this, 
European  countries  have  tried  to  maintain  their  attractiveness  regarding  FDI,  given  the 
increasing competition of emerging countries. In that regard, governments have to take into 
account that FDI motivations to choose a given location can be grouped in four categories: 
natural resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset or capability 
seeking (Dunning, 1980). The most consensual FDI determinants arising from those motivations 
are market size, labour costs, economic growth, international trade, agglomeration effects and 
corporate taxes.  
Analysing these determinants in terms of governmental policies regarding FDI, corporate 
taxes  emerge  as  an  instrument  with  the  most  immediate  effects.  Arguably,  the  use  of  this 
instrument  to  attract  FDI  may  explain  why  along  the  last  decades  corporate  tax  rates  have 
significantly  declined  around  the  world.
1  In a general perspective, Devereux  et al .  (2008) 
acknowledge that the average tax rate amongst the OECD countries in early  1980s was nearly 
50% and by 2001 fell under 35%. According to the tax data used in this paper, provided by 
Overesch and Rincke (2008), the average corporate tax rate (mea sured by the statutory tax 
rate, i.e. the legally imposed tax rate) for 29 European countries has fallen from 33.4% in 1998 
to 25.1% in 2006.  
Although  there  is  a  generalized  notion  that  corporate  taxes  may  be  an  important 
determinant  of  FDI,  the  empirical  literature  presents  diverse  results.  Devereux  and  Griffith 
(2002)  state  that  “there  is  some  evidence  that  taxes  affect  firm’s  location  and  investment 
decisions, although we do not have a very good idea about the size of this effect”. Differences in 
results  arise  essentially  from  different  measures  of  tax  rates,  FDI  data  and  econometric 
methods. 
                                                           
1 Some authors studied the relation between the decline in tax rates and the increasing capital market 
integration, and ended up investigating if countries compete over corporate tax rates (see for example 
Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Devereux et al., 2008; Karkalakos and Makris, 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 
2009).  There  is  a  clear  notion  that  countries  have  lowered  their  corporate  tax  rates  in  response  to 
increasing capital market integration. However, the literature has found it hard to explain why and how 
exactly countries do in fact adjust their tax systems (Overesch and Rincke, 2009). 2 
 
Figure 1 – FDI inflows to Europe 
 
Source: Data from UNCTAD and authors’ graph. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it uses a nine years (1998 to 
2006) firm-level dataset consisting of 20,886 worldwide projects of real investment hosted in 29 
European countries. This contrasts with majority of the studies seen in the literature that use 
national  aggregate statistics. Besides that, the  analysed  period  is rather interesting, since it 
embraces  two  periods  of  great  FDI  expansion  interrupted  by  an  abrupt  descent.  We  take 
advantage of this to investigate whether these cycles influence the impact of taxes on FDI. Also 
during the same period, corporate tax rates have shown a strong declining tendency. Secondly, 
this paper evaluates whether the presence of a country in favoured economic areas, like the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), affects the impact of corporate taxes on the location of FDI. 
Finally, it analyses how the response of FDI to taxes depends on specific project characteristics, 
such as the sector, technology and capital intensity.  
The  empirical  analysis  uses  three  measures  of  corporate  taxation,  but  focuses  on  the 
effective average tax rate which is deemed in the literature as the most appropriated to explain 
FDI location decisions (Devereux and Griffith, 1998).
2 This paper also investigates if tax rates’ 
volatility has an impact on FDI. 
The project-level dataset is used to estimate a conditional logit model, which allows us to 
conclude that if the host country’s effective tax rate decreases by one percentage point (pp.), 
the odds ratio of this country receiving an FDI project increases by about 3.1%.
3 
Since FDI has positive effects on the host economy (Borensztein et al., 1998), our results 
should be of major interest for policy makers, in particular our sectorial analysis of FDI.  In this 
regard,  recall  the  experience  of  Ireland  and  the  Netherlands,  which  are  known  for  their 
enormous success attracting FDI, particularly in the services activities. These case studies were 
made possible, partially, by a strong fiscal stimulus. On the other hand, our results should be 
                                                           
2 The EATR is an estimation of the tax level that a firm effectively faces taking into account all the aspects 
of the tax code, as for example fiscal benefits and deductions. 
3 The odds ratio is equal to the probability of locating in the country divided by the probability of not 
locating in the country, i.e.                         3 
 
useful  for  multinational  companies  investing  in  Europe,  as  they  represent  a  benchmark  of 
multinationals’ behaviour. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature on corporate taxes and FDI. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical work. 
Section 4 explains the econometric approach. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  A revision of selected literature on corporate taxes and FDI 
One of the first authors studying the effect of corporate taxes on FDI was Hartman (1984) and 
since then the literature has grown substantially. For an extensive survey see, for example, de 
Mooij and Ederveen (2003). Hartman’s study concludes that taxes negatively affect investments 
based on retained earnings, while they do not affect FDI based on new transfers. Hartman’s 
research  had  some  limitations  and  a  series  of  researchers  soon  followed,  trying  to  test  his 
findings. 
Slemrod (1990), using effective tax rates, concludes that corporate taxes do in fact repel 
FDI in general and, particularly, the FDI based on transfer of funds, contradicting Hartman’s 
findings.  Slemrod  adds  that,  regarding  the  parent  country’s  system  of  dealing  with  double 
taxation (exemption or credit), there is no evidence that it is a relevant determinant of FDI. 
These two papers were part of a first body of literature, devoted to the study of inward FDI 
in the US using aggregate data on FDI, which has its certain limitations. In particular, aggregate 
data on FDI include investments such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) which involve an 
ownership decision and hardly a real investment decision. Auerbach and Hasset (1993) argue 
that real and financial investments may be differently affected by taxes, which was validated by 
later research. 
Building on this notion, Swenson (2001) studies inward FDI in the US, from 46 countries, 
distinguishing between 6 types of FDI. She argues that the statutory tax rates negatively affect 
new plants and plant expansions for most of the investing countries while the effect on mergers 
and acquisitions is significantly positive for all countries. Swenson also notes that investments in 
new plants are more sensitive to taxes than plant expansions. She suggests that this is justified 
mainly by the fact that the company’s current choices may be constrained by its prior decisions. 
In order to overcome the limitations of the aggregated data on FDI, some studies on the 
US have instead used data on property, plant and equipment (PPE), which was thought to be a 
better measure of real investments (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994, Hines, 
1996). While Grubert and Mutti (1991) use only data on manufacturing firms, Hines and Rice 
(1994) study all nonbank companies and obtain a higher tax elasticity. This suggests that non-
manufacturing firms probably respond more to taxes than manufacturing firms. In general, the 4 
 
studies using PPE found larger negative effects of taxes on FDI than the previous studies with 
aggregate data (Hines, 1999).
4 
Another strand of the literature uses firm -level data. For instance, Devereux and Griffith 
(1998) analyse the decision of US multinationals firms investing in Europe with a nested 
multinomial logit model. The location decision, which is the last branch of the autho rs’ model, is 
modelled with a conditional logit, similar to the one used in this paper. The authors find that an 
increase  in  the  effective  tax  rate  significantly  reduces  the  probability  of  a  country  receiving 
foreign investment, while the statutory and marginal tax rates do not have a significant role.
5 
Devereux and Griffith also find that when considering only new entrants in Europe, the effective 
tax rate becomes insignificant. 
More recently, Buettner and Ruf (2007) use a firm -level panel of non -financial German 
multinationals’  subsidiaries,  between  1996  and  2003.  Their  approach  also  uses  a  discrete 
choice analysis with a fixed-effect logit model, where the relevance of alternative measures of 
taxation is tested. Like in Devereux and Griffith (1998), the marginal effective tax rate has no 
effect on location decisions. In addition, the statutory tax rate has a considerable stronger effect 
on FDI decisions than the effective average tax rate. 
Stowhase  (2002)  also  uses  data  on  German  multinationals  that  choose  to  locate 
investment in EU countries between 1991 and 1998. But his focus is on the distinction between 
investment for profit-shifting and investment in real activity. It is hypothesized that while the first 
type of investment is affected by the statutory tax rates, the second type is conditioned more by 
effective tax rates, because the latter type of investment responds to a broader range of tax 
incentives which are more accurately measured by the effective tax rates. Using count data, 
they confirm the hypothesis: investment in production activities is affected by effective tax rates, 
but not by statutory rates, whereas investment more related with profit shifting (service, finance 
and R&D activities) is more severely affected by statutory tax rates. 
The last result is not unexpected. As suggested by Devereux (1992), multinationals may 
undertake a strategy through which they locate production in a country where pre-tax profits are 
maximized, and afterwards the company shifts profits to a country with a lower statutory tax 
rate. Several other studies have further explored the issue of profit-shifting – see for example 
Haufler and Schjelderup (1999 and 2000) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008). 
Later,  Stowhase  (2006)  uses  a  panel  of  bilateral  aggregate  data  on  outward  FDI  – 
disaggregated  by  primary,  secondary  and  tertiary  sectors  -  from  Germany,  the  UK  and  the 
Netherlands, into eight European countries between 1995 and 1999. His findings are that the 
                                                           
4 The study of Hines (1996), which also uses data on PPE, was of particular interest because of the 
introduction in his model of dummy variables capturing state fixed-effects. In this way, he intended to solve 
one of the limitations of applying cross sectional data, which was the possible correlation of taxes with 
unobserved state characteristics (Hines, 1999). 
5 The marginal tax rate is the rate paid by a firm realizing a marginal investment decision. 5 
 
primary sector is unaffected by the effective tax rate while the secondary and the tertiary sectors 
are, the latter to a higher degree. 
Another study exploring the sectorial dimension uses a Poisson count model to examine 
the impact of taxes on the location of industry through the analysis of firm births across states in 
the  US  (Papke,  1991).  His  results  point  to  a  significant  impact  of  taxes  on  the  location  of 
manufacturing plants, which varies substantially across different industries. The effective tax 
rate  has  a  negative  and  significant  effect  (but  with  wide  quantitative  differences)  on  foreign 
investment in Apparel, Furniture and Communication Equipment industries, but has no effect on 
Electronic Equipment industry. 
The  survey  of  de  Mooij  and  Ederveen  (2003)  provides  an  extensive  synthesis  of  the 
literature on the effect of taxation on FDI. After transforming the results of 25 empirical studies 
they find a mean elasticity of -3.3, suggesting that a 1 pp. decrease in the host country’s tax rate 
raises FDI by 3.3%. However, they indicate that there is substantial variation among studies that 
can be explained by differences in the data (both on taxes and FDI) and in the econometric 
specifications. 
From what we have described, some points of debate seem to emerge in the literature. 
First, the impact of taxes on FDI depends on the exact measure of tax rate used (statutory, 
effective or marginal). Second, the effect of taxes on FDI seems to differ across sectors; with 
different  definitions  of  tax  rate  having  different  effects  across  sectors.  Third,  project 
characteristics, such as the sector or whether it is a new project or an expansion, are important 
in determining the effect of taxes. Our paper aims to contribute to these debates. 
 
3.  Data 
3.1. FDI 
In  this  paper  we  use  micro  data  on  FDI  projects.  The  dataset  used  is  from  the  European 
Investment  Monitor  (EIM)  of  Ernst  &  Young  (EY)  and  includes  the  announcement  of  FDI 
projects which reflect real investment in manufacturing or services carried out in Europe. M&A 
and other financial flows not resulting in any real investments are excluded.
6 
The dataset dates from 1998 to 20 06; it includes 20,886 FDI projects originating in 95 
countries, which are carried out in 29 European countries. The projects were undertaken by a 
total of 15,547 multinationals; 13,056 of them only account for one project, 1,532 account for 
two projects,  and 959 account for three or more projects. The dataset contains information 
about the country of origin, the company, the type of investment (new/expansion), the sector, 
the capital invested and the number of jobs created. Table 10 in Appendix A shows sev eral 
relevant descriptive statistics concerning the distribution of FDI projects. 
                                                           
6 For further details on the methodology of the EIM database see, for example, Ernst & Young (2011).   6 
 
Being a firm-level dataset, it allows the direct study of factual location decisions conducted 
by multinational firms, thus, an exact reproduction of real investment decisions. Accordingly, the 
use of this micro dataset in our paper is a significant contribution to the literature. 
 
3.2. Corporate taxes 
The exact measure of taxation to use is a topic of discussion within the literature. The most 
common  types  of  tax measures  are  the  statutory  tax  rate  (STR),  effective  average  tax  rate 
(EATR) and effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). The first has shown to be relevant for FDI 
decisions and it is viewed as particularly important for profit-shifting decisions of multinational 
companies  (Huizinga  and  Laeven,  2008).  A  clear  advantage  of  the  STR  is  that  it  does  not 
require laborious computations and so it is easier to use. Consequently, it should be the correct 
rate  to  use  whenever  we  study  firms  which  are  not  very  sophisticated  in  their  decisions. 
However, the STR omits important aspects regarding the tax burden on a real investment, such 
as fiscal benefits, credits, deductions, depreciation allowances and non-income taxes. 
The EATR, in turn, estimates the level of taxes that companies effectively face, taking into 
consideration several features of tax codes. Studies on FDI tend to support the view that the 
EATR is the most appropriate measure of corporate taxation. Contrary to the STR, it is a more 
complex  measure  of  taxation,  which  reflects  all  relevant  income  and  non-income  taxes  and 
comprises several important aspects of tax codes. Finally, the EMTR is calculated upon the tax 
incentive  on  a  firm’s  marginal  investment.  In  the  literature,  the  EMTR  turns  out  as  rather 
insignificant  in  relation  to  FDI  location  decisions,  since  location  decisions  are  not  marginal 
(Devereux and Griffith, 2003). 
As suggested by Devereux and Griffith (1998), investors choose between a set of locations 
comparing the after-tax level of profits in each of them, and the relevant measure of taxes is the 
EATR. As for the EMTR, it is a determinant of the optimal level of production in each alternative, 
which  indirectly  affects  the  location  decision.  Therefore,  Devereux  and  Griffith  argue  that, 
despite the fact that both these two tax measures may affect the location decision, the direct 
effect of the EATR should outweigh the indirect effect of the EMTR. 
In the empirical work, we use data for the three above described measures of corporate 
taxation, which were obtained by Overesch and Rincke (2008). The STR was calculated as the 
headline tax rate on corporate income adjusted to surcharges and local income taxes. As for the 
EATR and EMTR, Overesch and Rincke use a methodology proposed by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003)  with some assumptions following the European Commission (2001). In essence, this 
method consists in determining the effective tax level of a hypothetical standardized investment 
project.  This  standardized  investment  project  contains  investment  in  industrial  buildings, 
machinery,  intangible  assets,  inventories  and  financial  assets.  The  pre-tax  rate  of  return  is 
assumed to be of 20%, in accordance with the European Commission (2001). Table 1 shows 
the relevant descriptive statistics for the tax data. 7 
 
Table 1– Descriptive statistics 
 
Note: Data for agglomeration effects (GVA manufacturing as percentage of total GVA) are not available for Greece in 
1998 and 1999. The meaning of the variables EA, EU, Core, EATR volatility, STR volatility, Change direction EATR, 
Change direction STR, Cycle, New Investment, Services, High tech and Capital intensity will be explained below.  
 
3.3. Other variables 
Our estimations include four control variables commonly referred in the literature as relevant 
FDI determinants: gross domestic product (GDP) in nominal terms, as a measure of market 
size; yearly nominal compensation per employee, as an indicator of labour costs; yearly real 
GDP  growth  rate  as  an  indicator  of  economic  expansion,  and  gross  value  added  (GVA)  in 
manufacturing  as  a  percentage  of  total  GVA,  measuring  agglomeration  effects  on  the  host 
country. The first two variables were used in logarithmic form. GDP, GDP growth rate and GVA 
were collected from Eurostat and the yearly nominal compensation per employee from AMECO. 
The remainder of the variables will be described as they are introduced. Table 1 shows the 
relevant descriptive statistics for all the control and dummy variables. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Country characteristics
EATR 261 0.254 0.068 0.140 0.390
STR 261 0.286 0.079 0.100 0.565
EMTR 261 0.180 0.083 -0.195 0.356
log GDP 261 11.772 1.550 8.517 14.660
log Labour cost 261 2.828 0.925 0.558 4.051
GDP growth rate 261 0.036 0.027 -0.057 0.117
Agglom. effects 259 0.189 0.048 0.082 0.343
EA 261 0.363 0.481 0.000 1.000
EU 261 0.636 0.481 0.000 1.000
Core 261 0.276 0.447 0.000 1.000
EATR volatility 203 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.055
STR volatility 257 0.010 0.018 0.000 0.128
Change direction EATR 202 0.074 0.262 0.000 1.000
Change direction STR 257 0.027 0.163 0.000 1.000
Cycle 261 0.555 0.497 0.000 1.000
Projects characteristics
New Investment 20,885 0.661 0.473 0.000 1.000
Services 20,886 0.520 0.500 0.000 1.000
High tech 12,587 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000
Capital Intensity 4,965 0.404 2.182 0.000 125.0008 
 
4.  Econometric approach  
This  paper  addresses  the  multinationals’  choice  between  several  possible  locations  when 
headed to serve a foreign market through FDI. We adopt a  version  of the multinomial logit 
model developed by McFadden (1974) – the conditional logit model or “McFadden’s choice” 
model. After deciding to undertake a project abroad, a multinational company has to choose 
where  to  locate  its  investment.  Hence,  a  company  realizing  project  i  chooses  the  location  j 
where it maximizes profits. This choice can be described as 
                      
           
      
        
    
                                                               
,  where     
    denotes  the  expected  profit  of  project               in  country            .  The 
expected profit is a function of country characteristics     and of project characteristics   , and 
an unobserved random element     
   
                                                                                 (2) 
The  model  allows  country-specific  variables  for  all  alternatives,  not  just  the  chosen 
alternative. For each country-specific variable there is only one coefficient to be estimated, while 
for each project-specific variable there are j coefficients to be estimated. The model estimates 
the location probability     under which the project i chooses the j country as 
                   ∑                                                                   
        (3) 
The model includes country fixed-effects, which translate the impact of unobserved time-
invariant country characteristics on their probability to attract FDI projects. Such characteristics 
include, for instance, geographical location with respect to the rest of Europe, language, culture, 
and infrastructures. The introduction of country fixed-effects allows overcoming the possibility of 
correlation  between  taxes  and  unobserved  country  characteristics.  Several  authors  have 
emphasized the importance of performing such control (Bartik, 1985; Phillips and Goss, 1995; 
Hines, 1996; Buettner and Ruf, 2007). In addition, since only m - 1 of the coefficients    are free 
to vary, one of the coefficients    has to be set equal to zero. As we discuss in more detail later 
on, the country chosen for this normalization was France.  
A possible limitation of the conditional logit model is the assumption of independence of 
irrelevant  alternatives  (IIA),  which  implies  that  the  ratio  of  the  probabilities  of  any  pair  of 
alternatives is independent of the set of other alternatives. This is usually illustrated with the red 
bus/blue bus example in the literature. This assumption is usually inadequate when we are in 
the  presence  of  two  or  more  alternatives  which  cannot  be  distinguished  and  weighed 
independently by the decision makers (McFadden 1974).  
(1) 9 
 
In our study, if the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives is verified, the 
unobserved  profit  will  have  an  error  term  that  is  uncorrelated  across  alternatives.  A  good 
discrete choice model will capture all the relevant observed characteristics affecting the location 
decision, leaving the error term uncorrelated.  
The most used test for the IIA hypothesis is the Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 
1984). The model comprising all the alternatives, generating an efficient estimator under the 
null, is compared with a model where some alternatives are restricted, and which generates a 
consistent  estimator.  In  practice,  this  test  requires  the  computation  of  several  models  by 
restricting one alternative at a time, and the comparison of each one of these models against 
the model with all the alternatives.  
The Hausman statistic is distributed as Chi-square, with the number of degrees of freedom 
equal to the rank of the difference in the variance matrices, and is defined as 
                                                                               (4)  
, where    is the coefficient vector from the consistent estimator,    is the coefficient vector from 
the  efficient  estimator,      is  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  consistent  estimator  and     is  the 
covariance matrix of the efficient estimator. Table 2 shows the results of the Hausman test for 
the base model of this paper with EATR.
7  There is no evidence for the rejection of the null 
which suggests that the difference in coefficients between the efficient and the consistent model 
is not systematic, supporting the assumption  of IIA.
8 The results of this Hausman test ensure 











                                                           
7 See Table 3 for the estimation output of the base model.   
8 Notice that in some cases the Hausman statistic is negative. Although it is theoretically impossible that a 
Chi-square distribution is negative, in concrete applications, the Hausman statistic may be negative “due to 
lack of positive semidefiniteness in finite sample applications” (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). However, 
in any case, a negative Hausman statistic is evidence in favour of the null. 10 
 
Table 2– Hausman test for IIA 
 
Note:  Total  of  28  Hausman  tests.  All  the  tests  show  evidence  for  H0:  difference  in  coefficients  is  not 
systematic. 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1. Tax rates’ levels 
We start by employing the conditional logit model first only with our four control variables and 
then introducing one measure of taxation at a time. Table 3 shows the results for this base 
model where column (1) includes only control variables and columns (2), (3) and (4) include the 
three measures of corporate taxation – EATR, STR and EMTR, respectively. 
Omitted df P>chi2 Evidence
Austria 0.48 25 1.000 for H0
Belgium 5.81 23 1.000 for H0
Bulgaria -0.47 19 ----- for H0
Croatia -0.49 26 ----- for H0
Czech Republic 0.73 19 1.000 for H0
Denmark 1.00 22 1.000 for H0
Estonia 0.50 22 1.000 for H0
Finland 14.84 31 0.994 for H0
Germany -2.00 25 ----- for H0
Greece 0.16 22 1.000 for H0
Hungary 0.32 17 1.000 for H0
Ireland 0.77 16 1.000 for H0
Italy -6.67 23 ----- for H0
Latvia 0.24 18 1.000 for H0
Lithuania 3.27 21 1.000 for H0
Luxembourg 0.30 20 1.000 for H0
Netherlands 1.55 22 1.000 for H0
Norway -1.06 19 ----- for H0
Poland 4.98 17 0.998 for H0
Portugal 4.48 22 1.000 for H0
Romania -3.27 18 ----- for H0
Slovakia 0.22 25 1.000 for H0
Slovenia 2.30 30 1.000 for H0
Spain 9.26 12 0.680 for H0
Sweden 0.00 29 1.000 for H0
Switzerland -0.05 26 ----- for H0
Turkey -0.46 21 ----- for H0
United Kingdom 24.51 20 0.221 for H0
chi211 
 
The coefficients for the control variables show the expected sign and are significant across 
the four specifications. They suggest, in line with the literature, that larger market size, stronger 
economic growth, higher agglomeration effects and lower labour costs increase the probability 
of a country receiving FDI. 
As  was  already  mentioned,  the  coefficients  measuring  the  country  fixed-effects  are 
normalized  using  France  as  base  alternative.  France  was  chosen  because  within  the  base 
model  with  EATR,  which  will  be  the  reference  model  throughout  this  paper,  France  is  the 
country  with  the  highest  fixed-effect.  Consequently,  this  normalization  means  that  the  more 
negative the constant, the less attractive these unobserved characteristics are for investors, 
relatively  to  France.  In  all  the  four  specifications  of  the  model,  these  terms  turn  out  to  be 
significant for almost every country. The exceptions are Belgium and the UK. There is also 
another set of countries with fixed characteristics only slightly less attractive than France (with a 
constant larger than -1.5), which are: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Spain 
and Sweden. 
Even though all three tax measures show negative and significant coefficients, the EATR is 
the  one  that  clearly  presents  the  largest  negative  effect  on  FDI.  Contrary  to  the  results  of 
Devereux and Griffith (1998), we find a significant negative impact even for the EMTR, although 
inferior to that of the EATR. The STR has the smallest coefficient but also proves significant. 
Notice that the STR’s coefficient is smaller in our results than in the study of Buettner and Ruf 
(2007). These authors suggest that the fact that in their study the STR proves to have a greater 
impact than EATR indicates that the location of subsidiaries by German multinationals may be 
partially driven by profit-shifting opportunities. 
As already discussed in Section 3, the EATR should be the best measure of the tax burden 
for real investments and the results show that it has the most negative coefficient of the three 
tax measures. The estimated coefficient indicates that a 1 pp. decrease of the EATR raises the 
odds ratio by about 3.1%. The impact on the country’s location probability can also be obtained 
by computation of the marginal effects. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), the marginal 
effects of a conditional logit model can be defined as 
                                                       
    
    
     (       )                      (5) 
Therefore,  as  the  marginal  effects  are  non-linear  across  p,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
estimate  them for  certain  levels  of  probability.  For  instance,  if  we  assume  a  country  with  a 
current location probability of 3.5%
9, then if the tax rate decreases by 1 pp. the marg inal effect 
on the probability is about 0.1 pp., equivalent to an approximate 3% increase.  The impacts on 
the location probabilities are non-linear across the level of probability,  such that the closer the 
probability is to 50% the smaller is the percentual impact. For example, for the UK, which is the 
                                                           
9  Equivalent  to  all  29  countries  having  the  same  probability  of  receiving  a  FDI  project  i.e.                         
            ⁄       .  12 
 
country with the highest probability of receiving a project, approximately 22.6%, a 1 pp. increase 
in the tax rate increases the probability by 0.55 (only a 2.4% increase).  
 
Table 3 – Base model 
 
Note: Conditional logit model with country fixed-effects. Agglomeration effects data for Greece in 1998 and 1999 are not 
available  implying  the  loss  of  11  cases  and  4603  observations. Robust  standard  errors  clustered  by  company  (in 
parentheses). Following McFadden 1974, the Pseudo-R2is defined as 1 - L1/L0, where L1 is the log likelihood of the full 
model and L0 is the log likelihood of the "constant only" model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
Rob. SE Rob. SE Rob. SE Rob. SE
EATR -3.119 *** (0.407)
STR -0.774 ** (0.334)
EMTR -1.235 *** (0.236)
log GDP 0.564 *** (0.206) 0.507 ** (0.213) 0.577 *** (0.215) 0.562 *** (0.215)
log Labour cost -0.475 ** (0.206) -0.562 *** (0.211) -0.502 ** (0.213) -0.544 ** (0.214)
GDP growth rate 8.165 *** (0.725) 7.580 *** (0.741) 7.968 *** (0.740) 8.034 *** (0.732)
Agglom. effects 4.824 *** (0.650) 2.010 *** (0.771) 3.860 *** (0.775) 3.709 *** (0.709)
Austria -1.139 *** (0.403) -1.325 *** (0.417) -1.100 *** (0.420) -1.231 *** (0.421)
Belgium -0.309   (0.373) -0.462   (0.386) -0.244   (0.389) -0.523   (0.392)
Bulgaria -1.607 *** (0.506) -2.496 *** (0.536) -1.698 *** (0.535) -2.022 *** (0.538)
Croatia -2.293 *** (0.624) -2.990 *** (0.655) -2.325 *** (0.656) -2.707 *** (0.667)
Czech Republic -1.211 *** (0.368) -1.536 *** (0.385) -1.148 *** (0.388) -1.402 *** (0.389)
Denmark -1.027 ** (0.446) -1.401 *** (0.463) -1.037 ** (0.464) -1.218 *** (0.466)
Estonia -1.497 * (0.785) -2.233 *** (0.822) -1.517 * (0.824) -1.828 ** (0.827)
Finland -2.564 *** (0.480) -2.710 *** (0.495) -2.498 *** (0.499) -2.612 *** (0.500)
France
Germany -1.354 *** (0.119) -1.074 *** (0.130) -1.225 *** (0.136) -1.320 *** (0.125)
Greece -3.101 ** (0.392) -3.566 *** (0.410) -3.140 *** (0.410) -3.357 *** (0.412)
Hungary -0.795 ** (0.400) -1.423 *** (0.424) -0.849 ** (0.423) -1.042 ** (0.424)
Ireland -1.274 *** (0.503) -1.735 *** (0.526) -1.289 ** (0.526) -1.416 *** (0.528)
Italy -2.330 *** (0.067) -2.324 *** (0.072) -2.262 *** (0.077) -2.511 *** (0.078)
Latvia -2.066 *** (0.702) -3.096 *** (0.742) -2.182 *** (0.740) -2.507 *** (0.743)
Lithuania -2.216 ** (0.626) -3.055 *** (0.658) -2.274 *** (0.657) -2.604 *** (0.660)
Luxembourg -1.975 *** (0.904) -2.507 *** (0.935) -1.974 ** (0.941) -2.204 ** (0.944)
Netherlands -0.913 *** (0.271) -1.109 *** (0.282) -0.914 *** (0.283) -1.004 *** (0.284)
Norway -2.733 *** (0.495) -3.208 *** (0.516) -2.798 *** (0.516) -2.889 *** (0.517)
Poland -1.312 *** (0.201) -1.842 *** (0.220) -1.371 *** (0.215) -1.587 *** (0.218)
Portugal -1.686 *** (0.358) -2.052 *** (0.375) -1.690 *** (0.375) -1.881 *** (0.377)
Romania -1.886 *** (0.342) -2.435 *** (0.362) -1.904 *** (0.362) -2.168 *** (0.365)
Slovakia -1.689 *** (0.517) -2.194 *** (0.539) -1.672 *** (0.543) -1.931 *** (0.544)
Slovenia -3.069 *** (0.723) -3.514 *** (0.749) -3.018 *** (0.754) -3.297 *** (0.757)
Spain -1.047 *** (0.096) -1.006 *** (0.102) -1.029 *** (0.103) -1.023 *** (0.103)
Sweden -1.100 *** (0.355) -1.385 *** (0.369) -1.080 *** (0.370) -1.234 *** (0.372)
Switzerland -1.143 *** (0.401) -1.520 *** (0.418) -1.164 *** (0.419) -1.299 *** (0.42)
Turkey -3.359 *** (0.190) -3.660 *** (0.201) -3.356 *** (0.200) -3.606 *** (0.205)

































Now quantitatively, let us compare our estimates with the two important studies using micro 
data  which  were  already  mentioned.  Devereux  and  Griffith  (1998)  do  not  find  a  statistically 
significant role of the STR, but their results indicate that a 1 pp. decrease in the EATR increases 
the odds ratio by about 6.8%, which is more than twice our result. Buettner and Ruf (2007), 
using  a  measure  of  EATR  similar  to  ours,  find  an  impact  on  the  odds  ratio  of  only  1.3%, 
although not statistically significant at a 10% level of confidence. They also point to an increase 
of the odds ratio by about 2.5% when the STR decreases 1 pp. This is more than three times 
larger than our result for the STR. 
It is also interesting to compare the impact of the EATR with the impact of some of the 
control variables. For instance, on average, the decrease of 1 pp. in the EATR has a similar 
effect on the odds ratio to a decrease in the labour costs (yearly nominal compensation per 
employee) of about 950 € per employee. As for the GDP growth rate, it would have to increase 
by about 0.4 pp. This clearly suggests that corporate tax rates can be instrumental for policy 
makers in order to attract FDI. 
 
5.2. Tax rates’ volatility 
The previous results reported in this paper, as well as across the literature, suggest that the 
level of tax burden is a significant determinant of FDI. It is plausible, though, that the volatility of 
taxes also affects foreign investment. A history of frequently changing taxes may repel investors 
as it induces uncertainty regarding the future evolution of those taxes. This interferes with the 
agents’ projection of after tax profits, and is especially harmful for more risk-averse investors 
and also for projects with a higher degree of irreversibility. Interestingly, this aspect has not 
received much attention in the literature, with the exception of Edmiston et al. (2003). In their 
study, Edmiston et al. conclude that uncertainty regarding the tax laws repels FDI. 
In order to test the effect of taxes’ volatility, we include as a determinant of investment the 
standard deviation of the current and last two periods of the EATR (t, t-1 and t-2) – Std. Dev. 
EATR.  Consequently,  the  regression  only  embraces  the  period  between  2000  and  2006, 
because we only have data for the EATR since 1998. We also introduce a dummy variable to 
capture the specific effect of changes in opposing directions.
10 The tax rate’s volatility appears 
to have a significant negative impact on FDI: an increase of 0.01 in the standard deviation 
reduces  the  odds  ratio  of  the  location  probability  by  about  4.3%  (column  (1)  of  Table  4). 
Furthermore, changes of the EATR in opposing directions do not have a statistically significant 
effect on FDI, i.e., they do not add information to the volatility of the EATR. 
In order to explore the full extent of our dataset, we collected data from Eurostat for the 
head statutory tax rate since 1998. In a regression similar to the one of EATR, but for this 
                                                           
10 This dummy variable takes the value one if the tax rate suffers a decrease (larger than 0.5 pp.) after a 
period where it remained constant or increased. The dummy also takes the value one if the tax rate suffers 
an increase (larger than 0.5 pp.) after a period where it remained constant or decreased.   14 
 
statutory tax rate, the volatility does not have a significant effect on the location of FDI (column 
(2) of Table 4). Contrarily to the EATR, only the changes in opposing directions of the statutory 
tax rate have a negative impact on FDI.  
 
Table 4 – Tax rates’ volatility 
 
Note: See notes to Table 3. For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients for control 
variables and the constants for each country were omitted. In (1) and (2) the cases 
for 1998 and 1999 were lost. 
 
5.3. Euro area, European Union and core/periphery 
In the FDI literature some authors argue that membership in the EU and euro area facilitates the 
attraction of FDI. Firstly, in the recent enlargements of the EU, new members have witnessed 
gains in terms of FDI, which, however, have been counterbalanced by losses in some older 
member  states  (Breuss,  2001).  Additionally,  Petroulas  (2007)  suggests  that  countries  that 
joined the EMU have had an increase in inward FDI. This last result is in accordance with the 
theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), which argues that the creation of a monetary union 
should lead to an increase in FDI, mainly due to the elimination of the exchange rate risk and 
transaction costs associated with different currencies (Mundell, 1961). Exploring this reasoning, 
we evaluate whether countries within these two areas are able to set higher taxes than other 
countries, without affecting FDI. 
EATR  -5.104 ***
Std. Dev. EATR -4.169 ***
Change Direction EATR -0.043
STR -0.654 *
Std. Dev. STR 0.492
Change Direction STR -0.106 **
Log Likelihood -45,582 -56,508
Pseudo R
2 0.1828 0.1897
Nr of alternatives 29 29
Nr of cases 16,588 20,848









It can also be argued that it is not the institutional belonging to some area that makes the 
difference in terms of FDI, but instead the existence of agglomeration forces in such areas. 
These forces are in some extend incommensurable and cannot be assessed simple by using 
one  variable.  In  turn,  this  type  of  agglomeration  forces  capture  with  the  broader  distinction 
between core and peripheral countries (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). Building on this notion, it 
can be argued that core countries will be able to set higher taxes when compared to peripheral 
countries without repelling FDI. 
A problem that emerged in our work was that the separation between core and peripheral 
European  countries  varies  widely  across  the  literature.  Taking  into  consideration  the  recent 
developments  in  the  European  economy,  we  restrict  the  core  to  Austria,  Belgium,  France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. 
To capture the importance of belonging to the euro  area, European Union or  core, we 
construct  three  dummy  variables,  which  equal  one  if  the  country  belongs  to  the  group  in 
question and zero otherwise (EA, EU and Core, respectively). Next, we multiply the EATR by 
each of the dummy variables and introduce these interactions individually in the regressions, 
producing three distinct specifications. Table 5 shows the results: column (1) for the euro area, 
column  (2)  for  the  European  Union  and  column  (3)  for  Europe’s  core.  The  coefficients  are 
statistically  significant  and  have  the  expected  signs  for  both  the  euro  area  and  the  core. 
However,  for  the  European  Union,  the  coefficient  is  unexpectedly  negative,  but  it  is  not 
statistically significant. 
The irrelevance of the EU is understandable, since almost all countries, if not all, that do 
not  belong  to  the  EU,  have  trade  agreements  either  with  the  Union  itself  or  with  its  major 
countries.  This  eliminates  the  more  obvious  advantages  of  being  part  of  the  EU:  the  free 
movement of goods and services. Moreover, as the literature suggests, even the benefits of the 
EU enlargements for the new members may have been counterbalanced by losses in some 
older member states (Breuss, 2001). 
With  respect  to  the  euro  area,  the  results  suggest  that  investors  do  in  fact  see  the 
elimination of currency risk as an advantage, which is especially understandable if they intend 
to  serve  more  euro  area  countries  with  their  investment.  Another  advantage  of  a  strong 
currency like the euro is that it allows foreign investors to repatriate profits with a substantial 
exchange rate gain. Notice also that being part of Europe’s core allows countries to set higher 
tax  rates  than  others,  and  the  effect  is  larger  than  for  euro  area  countries:  the  marginal 
coefficient is approximately three times the one of the euro area.
11  
The  impact  on  the  odds  ratio  of  an  increase  in  the  EATR  by  1  pp.  is  reduced  by 
approximately 0.5 pp. if a country is part of the euro area. The equivalent marginal  effect, for a 
current location probability of 3.5%, decreases by about 14%. As for the country being part of 
                                                           
11 Notice that some countries belong to the euro area but not to the core, and vice-versa. In order to 
capture  possible  correlated  effects,  we  ran  the  model  with  the  interaction  for  core  and  euro  area 
simultaneously. The two coefficients remained significant and in the same proportion.   16 
 
Europe’s core as opposed to the periphery, the impact on the odds ratio falls by around 1.5 pp. 
and the marginal effect at the same level of probability as before decreases by about 44%. 
In order to further assess the benefits of the exchange risk elimination within the euro area, 
we  estimated  two  additional  specifications  of  the  model.  These  consist  of  two  separate 
estimations using the interaction term of EATR with the dummy variable for euro area: column 
(4) includes only the projects with origin within the euro area and column (5) includes all the 
other projects. Despite a slight loss of significance of the interaction term when the estimation 
includes only the projects originating within the euro area – with a p-value of 0.075 –, the results 
show the expected difference in the smoothing effects. While for investors from outside the euro 
area  the  reduction  of  the  impact  of  the  EATR  on  the  odds  ratio  is  approximately  17%,  for 
investors from within the euro area the smoothing effect is about 43%. 
This  finding  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  investors  based  in  the  euro  area  value  the 
elimination of the exchange risk much more than other investors. The euro area investors are 
able to eliminate the exchange risk in two dimensions: (1) in the outflows and inflows of capital 
between the base country and the host country, and (2) in the transactions inside the euro area.  
Investors based outside the euro area, on the other hand, only eliminate the second dimension 
of the exchange risk. 
 
Table 5 – Taxes and the belonging to favoured regions 
 
Note: See notes to Table 3. For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients for control variables and the constants for each 





EATR -3.390 *** -3.027 *** -3.481 *** -5.537 *** -2.176 ***
(0.402) (0.422) (0.453) (0.956) (0.501)
EATR * EA 0.481 *** 2.360 * 0.368 **
(0.147) (1.324) (0.161)
EATR * EU -0.227
(0.247)
EATR * Core 1.541 **
(0.736)
Log Likelihood -56,659 -56,664 -56,662 -16,755 -39,248
Pseudo R
2 0.1922 0.1922 0.1922 0.1627 0.2171
Nr of alternatives 29 29 29 29 29
Nr of cases 20,875 20,875 20,875 5,949 14,926
Nr of observations 601,091 601,091 601,091 171,920 429,171
(4) (5) (1) (2) (3)17 
 
5.4. Taxes and cycles of FDI 
Our results indicate that economic and monetary integration  reduces the negative impact of 
taxes on FDI. Indeed, from 1998 to 2000, just before the launching of the euro and in its first 
years, there was a very large increase of FDI to Europe. More generally, the inflow of FDI to 
Europe has evolved by the following pronounced cycles: from 1990 up to 2000 there was an 
upward cycle followed by a downward cycle until 2004; afterwards and until 2007, there was 
another upward FDI cycle, followed by a downward cycle. 
It is possible to draw the hypothesis that during periods of rapid growth of FDI the adverse 
impact of corporate taxes is smaller. Perhaps, during such periods, profit opportunities are so 
high that investors pay less attention to the share given away in taxes. To test this hypothesis, 
we create a dummy variable (Cycle) which takes value one for the years of upward cycles of 
FDI inflow to Europe (1998, 1999, 2000, 2005 and 2006). This dummy was interacted with the 
EATR and introduced in the regression as a determinant of FDI. The dummy variable for the 
euro was also introduced once its creation may be partially correlated with the expansion of FDI 
between 1998 and 2000. The results indicate that, indeed, during cycles of FDI growth, taxes 
have a smaller effect in deterring foreign investments (Table 6). The effect of a 1 pp. increase of 
the EATR reduces the odds ratio by 4.3% in periods of FDI decline and by 3.4% in periods of 
FDI increase. 
 
Table 6 – Taxes and cycles of FDI 
 
 
Note: For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients 
for control variables and the constants for  each 










EATR * Cycle 0.867 ***
(0.221)





Nr of alternatives 29
Nr of cases 20,875




EATR * Cycle 0.867 ***
(0.221)





Nr of alternatives 29
Nr of cases 20,875
Nr of observations 601,09118 
 
5.5. Project characteristics 
In the next subsections we analyse how the response of FDI to taxes depends on the specific 
characteristics of each project, such as the fact of it being a new investment or an expansion, as 
well as its sector, level of technology and capital intensity. 
 
5.5.1.  Expansions vs. New investments 
With regard to different types of projects, one may argue that new investments and expansions 
react differently to variations of corporate tax rates. As seen above, Swenson (2001) concludes 
that FDI in new plants reacts more to taxes than FDI in plant expansions, arguing that the firm’s 
current choices are constrained  by prior decisions. However, this quite intuitive result has not 
been corroborated by other works. Devereux and Griffith (1998) find that restricting their sample 
only to new entrants in Europe the effective tax rate becomes insignificant in affecting FDI. In 
the same line of reasoning, Hartman (1984) and Young (1988) suggest that taxes negatively 
affect investments based on retained earnings but do not affect FDI based on new transfers. If 
we accept that new investments are mainly financed with new transfers and expansions are 
mainly financed with retained earnings, such evidence shows that new investments are less 
sensitive to taxes. 
In order to clarify if expansions or new investments are more sensitive to taxes, column (1) 
of Table 7 shows a specification of our model where there is an interaction between EATR and 
a dummy variable that equals one when the project is a new investment and zero if it is an 
expansion or a new co-location (New Investment).
12 The result suggests that new investments 
are less sensitive to the EATR than expansions. The same occurs for the EMTR - Column (2) of 
Table 7. This latter result is also consistent since EMTR should be more important for marginal 
investments like expansions. 
Generalizing,  our  results seem to confirm the findings of Devereux and Griffith (1998), 
Hartman (1984) and Young (1988). Moreover, Rolfe et al. (1993) show, using a survey of US 
firms’ managers, that new projects are more sensitive to tax incentives that reduce their initial 
expenses (equipment and material exemption), whereas expanding firms prefer tax incentives 
that reduce profits. Taking this into account, our result can be justified by the fact that both the 
EATR  and  the  EMTR  are  capturing  more  the  way  a  country  is  taxing  profits  than  the  tax 
incentives it gives to initial investment expenses. 
 
 
                                                           
12 It is worth mentioning two points. Firstly, since a new co-location project consists of a new activity that is 
co-located at or near an existing activity, we decided to consider the new co-location projects together with 
expansions. Secondly, our database does not identify in which countries the firm has already invested, it 
only identifies if a given project is as expansion or not.   19 
 
Table 7 – Expansions vs. new investments 
 
Note: See notes to Table 3. For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients for control variables and the constants for each 
country were omitted. Project type data are missing for 1 case implying the loss of 1 additional case and 29 additional 
observations. Number of cases per type of project: Expansion - 7,076, New - 13,798. Both specifications include a 
dummy for the type of investment (new/expansion) as a case-specific variable. 
 
5.5.2.  Industrial functions vs. services 
A share of the literature suggests that the influence of tax rates on FDI location decisions may 
vary by sector. In order to investigate such differences, we create a specification of our model 
where a dummy variable, which equals one for services and zero for industrial functions, is 
interacted with each of the three tax measures (Services).
13 The results in Table 8 point to three 
interesting findings. 
Firstly, among all the tax measures, the EATR is the one with the highest coefficient for 
industrial functions. This suggests that as industrial investments involve higher tax deductible 
expenses, such as amortizations, they react more to EATR than to other tax measures. This 
finding is in accordance with the study of Stowhase (2002). 
Secondly, services are significantly less sensitive to all three tax measures. While it was 
expected that EATR and EMTR have a smaller effect on services than on industry, the reverse 
was expected for the STR. In fact, the literature concerning profit-shifting activities suggests that 
services’ investments may be particularly attracted by low statutory tax rates (Devereux, 1992; 
Stowhase, 2002).
14 
                                                           
13  Industrial  functions  include  the  activities  of  logistic,  manufacturing,  testing  and  servicing;  services 
include  contact  centres,  education  and  training,  headquarters,  internet  data  centre,  research  and 
development, sales and marketing, and shared services centres.   
14 Specification (2) shows a combined positive coefficient for services although not statistically significant , 
according to a joint significance Wald test.   
EATR -4.395 ***
(0.618)




EMTR * New investment 1.196 **
(0.469)
Log Likelihood -56,330 -56,348
Pseudo R
2 0.1969 0.1966
Nr of alternatives 29 29
Nr of cases 20,874 20,874
Nr of observations 601,062 601,062
(1) (2)    20 
 
Finally, specification (3) shows that the EMTR is significantly more important for industrial 
functions than for services. This finding can be justified in the following way. In industry, fixed 
costs  tend  to  be  larger  than  in  services,  because  of  the  larger  amount  of  capital  used. 
Therefore, comparatively to fixed costs, marginal costs are smaller in industry than in services. 
As a result, when making an investment decision, the proportional impact that taxes have on 
profit margins is larger in industry than in services. 
Generalizing these results, it can be argued that industrial functions are more sensitive to 
corporate taxation than services, no matter the tax measure used. The reason for this may be 
related to the fact that industrial companies are more mobile and more likely to compare taxes 
across  locations  (Wells,  1986).  In  addition,  some  industrial  companies  operate  with  smaller 
margins than services companies, which implies that taxes can affect more severely the profits 
of the former rather than of the latter (Morisset and Pirnia, 1999). 
 
Table 8 – Industrial functions vs. services 
 
Note: See notes to Table3. For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients for control variables and the constants for each 
country  were  omitted.  Number  of  cases  per  type  of  project:  Industrial  functions  -  10,014,  Services  -  10,861.  All 
specifications include a dummy for the type of investment (industrial functions/services) as a case-specific variable. A 
Wald test for simultaneous coefficient significance proved insignificant for specification (3). 
 
5.5.3.  High-tech manufacturing industries 
This section’s goal is to investigate whether high-tech manufacturing industries react more or 
less significantly to taxes when compared to other manufacturing industries. To our knowledge, 
this issue remains unexplored in the literature. To perform such an analysis, we create a dummy 
EATR -4.846 ***
(0.484)








EMTR * Services 1.601 ***
(0.451)
Log Likelihood -55,264 -55,292 -55,293
Pseudo R
2 0.2121 0.2117 0.2117
Nr of alternatives 29 29 29
Nr of cases 20,875 20875 20875
Nr of observations 601,091 601091 601091
(1) (2) (3)21 
 
variable only for the 12,587 manufacturing projects, which equals one if the project is of a high-
tech  manufacturing  industry,  and  zero  otherwise  (High-Tech  Manuf.).  The  High-tech 
manufacturing industries are defined using the classification of Eurostat and OECD, and they 
include  the  following  sectors:  pharmaceuticals,  computers,  office  machinery;  electronics-
communications and scientific instruments. 
The  estimations  indicate  that  high-tech  projects  are  less  sensitive  to  taxes  than  other 
projects (Table 9). However, the effect is statistically insignificant as the coefficient shows a p-
value of 18%. Nevertheless, this apparent smaller sensitivity of high-tech industries regarding 
the tax burden is arguably justified if we consider that this type of investment involves a larger 
amount of R&D, which tend to implicate, at least in the first years, limited or even negative cash 
flows  and  consequently  absence  of  taxable  profits.  Additionally,  Lindgaard  and  Lundvall 
(2004:15)  refer  that  low  taxes  do  not  stimulate  innovation,  but  only  increase  the  survival  of 
already existing firms that have a low probability of surviving. 
 
Table 9 – High-tech manufacturing industries and capital intensity 
 
Note: See notes to Table 3. For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients for control variables and the 
constants for each country were omitted. In (1) only manufacturing projects were considered. In (2) only 
cases with data for capital and employment were considered. Due to the lack of data for agglomeration 
effects in Greece in 1998 and 1999, 10 cases are lost in (1) and 3 in (2). 
 
5.5.4.  Capital intensity 
The last issue to be discussed concerning project characteristics is the level of capital intensity. 
Column (2) of Table 9 shows the results for a specification which includes the interaction of the 
EATR with a variable measuring the capital intensity of the project (capital invested in millions of 
US $ per job created) – Capital Intensity. The number of observations is significantly reduced as 
the  information  on  the  capital  invested  and  jobs  created  is  available  for  only  4,962  of  our 
investment projects. 
(1) (2)
EATR -3.634 *** -8.224 ***
(0.513) (0.823)
EATR * High-Tech Manuf. 1.304
(0.973)
EATR * Capital Intensity 3.037 ***
(1.069)
Log Likelihood -34,118 -13,050
Pseudo R
2 0.1924 0.2171
Nr of alternatives 29 29
Nr of cases 12,577 4,962
Nr of observations 361,832 142,76722 
 
The  coefficient  for  the  interaction  term  of  EATR  and  capital  intensity  of  the  project  is 
positive  and  statistically  significant,  suggesting  that  more  capital  intensive  projects  are  less 
sensitive to taxes. This finding may be justified by the fact that more capital intensive projects 
induce a higher level of amortization costs, reducing the taxable profits and consequently the 
sensitiveness  to  taxes.  Firms  that  are  more  capital  intensive  may  also  enjoy  larger  market 
power, because large amounts of capital may be a barrier to entry. Therefore, they will have 
larger margins and be less sensitive to tax rates. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence on the role of corporate taxes in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
location decisions. The use of a wide firm-level dataset grants an accurate representation of 
real investment decisions. We start by analysing the impact of the level and volatility of three 
measures  of  corporate  taxation  on  FDI.  Next,  we  analyse  how  economic  and  monetary 
integration determines the effect of taxes on FDI. Finally, we focus on how the impact of taxes 
depends on specific project characteristics. 
We find that the effective average tax rate (EATR) is, among the three tax rates used, the 
one with the largest impact on FDI. The main result indicates that a decrease in the EATR by 1 
pp. increases the odds ratio of a country receiving a FDI project by about 3.1%. Besides the tax 
rate level, it is also found that volatile corporate tax policy negatively affects FDI. 
Regarding the impact of economic and monetary integration, we find that countries within 
the  euro  area  or  part  of  Europe’s  core  are  able  to  set  relatively  higher  taxes  than  other 
European countries, to a certain degree,  without an adverse effect on FDI. Our results also 
indicate that during periods of FDI growth, the corporate tax rates have a smaller effect than 
during periods of FDI contraction. 
Regarding  project  characteristics,  results  indicate  that  the  effective  marginal  tax  rate 
(EMTR), as the literature suggests, is particularly relevant for expansion projects. Additionally, 
with respect to sectorial differences and in accordance with Stowhase (2002), the EATR proves 
to be the tax measure with the most negative impact on industrial functions. On the other hand, 
we  provide  evidence  that  services  are  less  sensitive  to  the  statutory  tax  rate  (STR)  when 
compared to industrial functions, contradicting Stowhase’s findings. In fact, services are less 
sensitive  than  industry  to  all  the  three  tax  measures.  Moreover,  high-tech  manufacturing 
projects are less sensitive to taxes, even though the difference is not statistically significant. Our 
results also indicate that projects that are more capital intensive are less sensitive to taxes. 
Because  they  are  new  to  the  literature,  the  interaction  between  taxes  and  the  level  of 
technology  and  capital  intensity  may  require  further  analysis,  essentially  regarding  the 
justification of the empirical relations shown. As for the tax rates’ volatility, there is the need of 
more data on tax codes’ changes to allow a deeper analysis. 23 
 
Summarizing,  the  results  presented  in  this  paper  suggest  that  setting  corporate  taxes 
carefully may be instrumental for policy makers in order to attract FDI. In fact, many of the 
empirical specifications developed in this study indicate that it should even be possible to attract 
specific  types  of  foreign  investments  by  manipulating  corporate  taxation.  Along  with  policy 
makers, these results may also prove relevant for multinational companies themselves as they 
are representative of some aspects of multinationals’ behaviour. 
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Table 10– Descriptive statistics (projects) 
 
Note: (*) Information on project type (Expansion/New) is missing for one project. 
 
Projects Share Projects Share
Host country
Austria 490 2.3% Lithuania 132 0.6%
Belgium 1,090 5.2% Luxembourg 45 0.2%
Bulgaria 278 1.3% Netherlands 695 3.3%
Croatia 89 0.4% Norway 53 0.3%
Czech Republic 792 3.8% Poland 904 4.3%
Denmark 379 1.8% Portugal 264 1.3%
Estonia 168 0.8% Romania 481 2.3%
Finland 134 0.6% Slovakia 318 1.5%
France 3,441 16.5% Slovenia 44 0.2%
Germany 1,628 7.8% Spain 1,239 5.9%
Greece 56 0.3% Sweden 652 3.1%
Hungary 910 4.4% Switzerland 468 2.2%
Ireland 715 3.4% Turkey 194 0.9%
Italy 401 1.9% United Kingdom 4,721 22.6%
Latvia 105 0.5% Total 20,886
Origin region
Africa 55 0.3% Mideast 152 0.7%
Asia 2,139 10.2% Multi-regional 895 4.3%
Caribean 69 0.3% North America 7,509 36.0%
Central & South America 55 0.3% Oceania 193 0.9%
Europe 9,819 47.0% Total 20,886
Project type
New investments 13,806 66.1% Industrial functions 10,018 48.0%
Expansions 7,079 33.9% Services 10,868 52.0%
Total *  20,885 Total 20,886